President Donald Trump in the aftermath of the U.S. military removing Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro appears to have backed off a second strike and is now focused on stabilizing the country’s leadership and economy.But legal scholars continue to say any effort by Trump to order more military strikes against the country without congressional approval would rest on a narrow set of constitutional and statutory authorities, all of which have meaningful limits.
While the Constitution divides war-making authority between Congress and the president, decades of precedent have allowed U.S. commanders-in-chief to initiate limited military actions on their own. Still, experts emphasize that such authority does not extend to prolonged or large-scale warfare absent express authorization from lawmakers.
Article II Commander-in-Chief Powers
The primary authority a president would invoke to justify unilateral military action is the Constitution.
Under Article II, the president serves as commander-in-chief and has broad authority to direct military operations, particularly for limited actions framed as defensive, law enforcement-related or in response to national security threats.
Presidential administrations have interpreted this provision to allow the president to use military force without prior congressional approval when the action is limited in scope and duration and serves important national interests. Those interests have typically included protecting U.S. personnel, deterring imminent threats, safeguarding American citizens abroad or defending U.S. allies.
Presidents from both parties have relied on this interpretation to authorize airstrikes, missile strikes and special operations. Examples include U.S. strikes in Syria under Presidents Trump and Barack Obama, the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011, and limited military actions against Iranian targets.
Legal experts say a one-time or short series of strikes against Venezuelan military or infrastructure targets could be defended under such authority, depending on the circumstances. However, Article II is generally understood to fall short of authorizing sustained hostilities, regime change, or military occupation.
The War Powers Resolution of 1973
Any unilateral strike would also be governed by the War Powers Resolution. The law was passed in 1973 after the United States fought the Korean and Vietnam wars without actual declarations of war.
The law allows the president to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities without advance congressional approval but requires the executive branch to notify Congress within 48 hours of doing so. Absent congressional authorization, military operations must terminate within 60 days, with an additional 30-day period allowed for withdrawal.
But the law has always been controversial. Every president since its 1973 passage has questioned the law’s constitutionality, viewing it as an unconstitutional infringement on executive power. Presidents from both parties have routinely circumvented or ignored its requirements without significant consequences. For example, Obama skirted the requirements in his 2011 intervention in Libya, as did Reagan in his 1986 bombing of Libya.
The resolution effectively permits short-term military action but is designed to prevent open-ended conflicts initiated solely by the executive branch.
Absence of an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
Unlike U.S. military operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, there is no standing Authorization for Use of Military Force that applies to Venezuela.
The 2001 AUMF, passed after the September 11 terror attacks, authorizes force against al-Qaeda and associated forces, while the 2002 AUMF addresses threats posed by Iraq. Legal analysts agree that neither statute provides a credible basis for military action against the Venezuelan government.
As a result, any strike on Venezuela would lack explicit congressional authorization and would rely almost entirely on inherent presidential powers under Article II, significantly narrowing the scope of lawful action.
International Law Justifications
Presidents often supplement domestic legal arguments with references to international law including claims of self-defense, collective self-defense or the protection of U.S. nationals abroad.
Such justifications could be cited if Venezuela were alleged to pose an imminent threat to U.S. interests or personnel. However, appeals to international law traditionally do not substitute for congressional authorization under U.S. law and primarily serve to reinforce, rather than replace, constitutional claims.
What a President Cannot Do Without Congress
Legal experts consistently draw a line between limited military action and full-scale war. Without congressional approval, a president would lack clear authority to initiate:
A full-scale invasion of Venezuela
A prolonged or open-ended bombing campaign
Military occupation or nation-building efforts
Formal regime-change operations carried out by force
